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In response to increasingpublic attention to the granting and receipt of corporate
perquisites, the Securities and Exchange Commission has published various pro-
nouncements and requirements apparently designed to elucidate the disclosure ex-
pected of reporting companies with respect to nonmonetaryforms of management
remuneration. The author, noting the ambiguous nature of the SEC's published
views, analyzes these requirements and identifies principles which can serve as guide-
lines/or disclosure. He then examines a number of standard corporate benefits in
light oftheseprinciples andsuggests treatmentsfor each. He concludes by discussing
the nature of the disclosure required and the registrant's duty to investigate in this
context under the federal securities laws.
INTRODUCTION
CORPORATE "PERQUISITES," the nonmonetary benefits fre-
quently received by corporate officers and directors in addition
to their salaries, have recently received considerable attention in
newspapers,' on television,2 and at "three-martini lunches."
While recurring efforts to alter the tax treatment of certain busi-
ness expenses 3 undoubtedly instigated some of this concern, the
* B.A. (1972), Cornell University; J.D. (1975), New York University. The author is
associated with the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, in its Cleveland office.
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, at 39, col. 1; id, Dec. 4, 1977, § 3, at 14, col. 3; Wall St.
J., Oct. 19, 1977, at 1, col. 6; id, May 2, 1977, at I, col. 6.
2. CBS, "Sixty Minutes" (Feb. 5, 1978).
3. For example, in 1978 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) amended its audit hand-
book to deal with perquisites. Eg., N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1978, at A-I, col. 4, and D-I,
cols. 5-6. The present Administration has publicly stated its intention to revise the rules in
this context. 1d Efforts by the IRS to change applicable rules have been frustrated by
congressional action. Eg., Wall St. J., May 24, 1978, at 10, col. 1. See generally FORBES,
July 24, 1978, at 20.
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activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have
thus far garnered the most attention in this context.
In August, 1977, the SEC issued a purportedly interpretive re-
lease (First Release) expressing its view that "the existing report-
ing provisions under the securities acts require registrants to
include within the remuneration reported all forms of remunera-
tion which are received by management from the corporation, in-
cluding personal benefits sometimes referred to as 'perquisites.'"
To be sure, companies subject to SEC regulation have historically
been required to report the amount of "remuneration" paid to di-
rectors and particular officers whose aggregate direct remunera-
tion exceeds a specified amount, as well as that paid to all officers
and directors as a group.5 Indeed, the SEC has instituted several
enforcement6 and administrative7 actions based on alleged corpo-
rate failures to include within reported remuneration the value of
various nonmonetary benefits received by officers and directors.
However, in connection with the publication of the First Release,
the SEC conceded that "the cases instituted by the Commission
have suggested misappropriation of the company's assets in addi-
tion to noncompliance with the disclosure provisions."' Thus,
while the First Release purported to be merely an interpretation
of existing disclosure requirements, it nonetheless seems clear that
through the First Release and subsequent actions the SEC in-
tended to direct the federal disclosure system into virgin areas.'
4. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5856 (Aug. 18, 1977), reprinted in 2 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) $ 23,019 (1978) [hereinafter cited as First Release).
5. The most significant of these disclosure requirements were previously contained in
Item 17 of Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1977) (registration statements); Item 16 of Form
10-K, id § 249.310 (annual reports); and Item 7 of Schedule 14A, id § 240.14a-101 (proxy
and information statements); they now appear in Item 4 of Regulation S-K, 5 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 70,962 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Regulation S-K].
6. E.g., SEC v. Montauk Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,114 (D.D.C.
1979); SEC v. Ormand Indus., Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,046 (D.D.C. 1977) (consent judgment); SEC v. Potter Instrument Co., [1976-77 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,924 (D.D.C. 1977) (consent judgment); SEC v.
Emersons, Ltd., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,544 (D.D.C.
1976) (consent judgment); SEC v. Medic-Home Enterprises, Inc., 8 SEC Docket 746
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
7. See, e.g., Matter of Atlantic Research Corp., 41 S.E.C. 733 (1963).
8. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-3 n. 1.
9. The SEC's implicit assumption that certain forms of personal benefits may bear
upon the "integrity of management" and the emphasis placed upon the accuracy with
which such benefits are reflected in corporate books and records suggest that the SEC's
activities in this context are but a natural extension of its campaign against so-called "ques-
tionable payments." Compare First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-4 to -7 with Report of
the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments
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On February 6, 1978, the SEC fired its second salvo in this
area "to provide further guidance to registrants."'" In its Second
Release the SEC articulated a few general principles which par-
tially resolved some of the ambiguities of the First Release and set
forth the SEC's position with respect to a number of specific types
of nonmonetary benefits.
The SEC invited comments on both of these releases," and it
is likely that the views so solicited formed the basis for the SEC's
inclusion of specific disclosure requirements pertaining to per-
sonal benefits in the amendments to the disclosure requirements
relating to management remuneration and transactions in Regula-
tion S-K, the consolidated disclosure regulation.' 2 While the
amended disclosure rules provide specific guidance with respect to
a few particular disclosure issues, like the First and Second Re-
leases they fail to establish any overall principles for determining
whether a particular nonmonetary benefit constitutes reportable
remuneration. The primary purpose of this Article is the estab-
lishment of such principles.
At the outset, the amended disclosure rules will be analyzed.
As will become apparent, these rules raise more questions than
they answer, necessitating further reference to the interpretive re-
and Practices 23-24, 30-31 (1976) (submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee of the Second Session of the 94th Congress) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Report]. The SEC utilizes generally parallel remedial measures in the two areas. Compare
Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1978, at 7, col. 2 (reporting the determinations of the audit committees
of six publicly held companies controlled by defendant that he and certain members of his
family were required to reimburse the companies an additional $1.1 million said to consti-
tute personal expenses) with SEC v. Katy Indus., Inc., No. 78C-347 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (con-
sent judgment and stipulation providing for the establishment of an independent authority
to review defendant's questionable payments investigation). See generaliy Wall St. J., May
2, 1977, at 1, col. 6, and 20, col. 1. In the questionable payments context, suggestions that
the SEC acted unfairly in retroactively applying new concepts were rejected by at least
some members of the SEC staff. See, e.g., Henderson & Sommer, Sensitive Corporate Pay-
ments: The SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program, 8 ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 423, 445-46
(1977). And, at least one court has held that the publication of the First Release cannot be
used to estop the SEC from instituting an enforcement action predicated upon a pre-Re-
lease failure to disclose personal benefits as direct remuneration. SEC v. Montauk Corp.,
[Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,114 (D.D.C. 1979).
10. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5904 (Feb. 6, 1978), reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) I 23,019A (1978) [hereinafter cited as Second Release].
11. Id at 17,059-16.
12. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6003 (Dec. 4, 1978), reprinted in [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) T 81,765. Certain questions arising under the remunera-
tion disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K were addressed by the Division of Corpo-
ration Finance in SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6166 (Dec. 12, 1979), reprinted in 5
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 70,962A (1979) [hereinafter cited as Third Release].
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leases.13 The interpretive releases will therefore be discussed with
a view toward extracting therefrom general principles to guide
analysis of whether particular nonmonetary benefits constitute re-
portable remuneration. 4 Several benefits which are commonly
provided to corporate executives will then be tested against such
principles.' 5 Finally, the nature of the disclosure required and the
duty to investigate possible failures to disclose such benefits in
prior periods will be briefly considered.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A. Amendments to Regulation S-K
The values of "personal benefits" furnished to certain manage-
ment personnel are now required to be reported as cash-
equivalent forms of remuneration in the table prescribed by Item
4(a) of Regulation S-K. 6 Except for benefits which "[do] not dis-
criminate in favor of officers and directors," for which no disclo-
sure is required, the personal benefits which now must be reported
are those which "are not directly related to job performance."' 7
13. In the Third Release, the Division of Corporation Finance stated that "except in a
limited number of specific instances the perquisite disclosure requirements of [Regulation
S-K] have not superseded the Commission's two earlier releases relating to the disclosure
of personal benefits in the remuneration table." Third Release, supra note 12, at 61,779.
That the SEC found it necessary to include specific provisions regarding nonmonetary ben-
efits in the amended remuneration disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K which add
little to the prior interpretive releases rather clearly suggests, however, that the interpretive
releases were really more than just that. But see SEC v. Montauk Corp., [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,114 (D.D.C. 1979).
14. Certain forms of nonmonetary benefits and indirect remuneration, such as stock
options, loans, and transactions with the issuer or registrant, have long been subject to
specific disclosure requirements. E.g., Item 4(d) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at
61,766. They will not be further discussed herein.
15. It should be noted that the appropriate treatment of nonmonetary benefits for fed-
eral income tax purposes and the role of state law in this area are outside the scope of this
Article, except to the extent that they may bear upon federal securities disclosure questions.
E.g., text accompanying notes 86-87 infra. For a discussion of the former issue, see, e.g.,
Note, Federal Income Taxation ofEmployee Fringe Benets, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1976).
The SEC has correctly taken the position that "the determination of reportable forms of
remuneration is not necessarily based upon what has been included by an officer or direc-
tor in gross income computed for tax purposes." First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-5
n.20. These issues are, of course, independently significant, and there is some evidence that
the IRS has been intensifying its scrutiny in this area. See, e.g., Wall St. ., Feb. 17, 1978,
at 4, col. 2.
16. Instruction 2(d) to Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,764.
17. Id Pursuant to express statutory authority, remuneration paid by the issuer or
registrant to its officers and directors must be disclosed. E.g., Item 14 of Schedule A, 15
U.S.C. § 77aa (1976). Given this statutory directive, the logic behind the exclusion of per-
sonal benefits provided to broad categories of employees might seem difficult to divine. If
[Vol. 30:3
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The instructions to the amended disclosure rules, however, fail
to provide any general principles by which the issuer or registrant
can determine whether a particular benefit meets this test. More-
over, the basic assertion that personal benefits-those not directly
related to job performance-must be disclosed adds virtually
nothing to the SEC's prior interpretive pronouncements in this
area.' 8 Hence, reference to the prior releases remains necessary
for an understanding of the amended disclosure rules.
B. The Interfpretive Releases
The SEC has stated that "management is usually in the best
position to determine whether a certain benefit should be viewed
as a form of remuneration based on the facts and circumstances
involved in each situation."' 9 Nonetheless, in the two releases the
SEC identified a number of personal benefits which do, or may,
constitute reportable remuneration and, in the First Release, pro-
vided two general exceptions for categories of personal benefits
which do not constitute reportable remuneration.
According to the SEC, six types of personal benefits make up
the category of benefits which should be reported under all cir-
cumstances: (1) home repairs and improvements; (2) housing and
other living expenses (including domestic service) provided at
principal or vacation residences of management personnel; (3) the
personal use of company property (such as automobiles, airplanes,
yachts, or apartments); (4) personal travel expenses; (5) personal
entertainment and related expenses; and (6) legal, accounting, and
other professional fees for matters unrelated to the business of the
registrant.2°
A second category of personal benefits which may in some
cases constitute forms of remuneration includes certain third-
an expenditure by an issuer relieves the recipient of a personal expense which he or she
would otherwise incur, it may be argued that the expenditure should be deemed to consti-
tute reportable remuneration regardless of the class of potential recipients. However, the
conclusion can be supported on policy grounds. See note 49 infra.
18. For example, in the Second Release the SEC stated, "The value of those benefits
received by management which are directly related to the performance of their job is not
required to be included in aggregate remuneration." Second Release, supra note 10, at
17,059-10. See also note 13 supra.
19. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-5.
20. Id at 17,059-5. The only types of nonmonetary benefits covered in the Second
Release which are not within the direct scope of the First Release are club memberships,
particular insurance and reimbursement plans, physicals, and security devices. See Second
Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-12 to -14. For a discussion of these benefits, see note 69
and text accompanying notes 89-104 infra.
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party benefits "such as favorable bank loans and benefits from
suppliers [in situations in which] the corporation compensates, di-
rectly or indirectly, the bank or supplier for providing the loan or
services to management; and the use of corporate staff for per-
sonal purposes."'"
These two categories of benefits are "personal" under the
terms of the interpretive releases and the amended disclosure rules
in the sense that they may relieve the recipient of expenditures
generally considered to be of a personal nature. The difference
between the SEC's treatment of the two categories of personal
benefits apparently arises from the fact that in the former the cor-
poration will in most instances incur an expense to provide the
benefit, whereas in the latter it will incur either no expense at all
(for example, a bank may make a "favorable" home loan to an
officer merely for goodwill purposes) or no incremental expense
(for example, corporate staff must be paid in any event). 2
In the First Release, the SEC identified two general categories
of admittedly personal benefits for which no disclosure is re-
quired: (1) incidental personal benefits and (2) benefits which are
ordinary and necessary to the conduct of the corporation's busi-
ness.23 Incidental personal benefits were described as those bene-
fits which are "directly related to job performance,"'24 the same
overriding concept utilized in the amended disclosure rules.25
Parking places, meals at company facilities, and office space and
furnishings were cited as examples of such benefits.2 6 However,
even this limited exception was qualified by the additional re-
quirement that incidental benefits be "authorized and properly ac-
counted for by the company. "27
21. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,057-6.
22. See text accompanying notes 38-40 infra.
23. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-5 to -6. Some authorities seemingly have
treated the two categories of exceptions as but a single exception with an aggregate test
requiring that a benefit be both "incidental" and "ordinary and necessary" to be excluded
from reported remuneration. Eg., McCoy & Griffin, W/hat's the Value of What's Included
in New Corporate Perquisite Rules, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 38, col. 1. It nevertheless
seems clear that an alternative approach was intended. Eppler & Yaeger, Management
Perquisites, 10 REv. OF SEC. REG. 841, 843-44 (1977).
24. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6.
25. See Instruction 2(d) to Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,764.
26. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6.
27. Id See also Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-8 ("Of course, accurate and
sufficiently detailed books and records are prerequisites to the appropriate disclosure of
remuneration information."). While it has been suggested that "falsified accounts and un-
reported funds are generally reportable in themselves," Garrett, Disclosure of "Emolu-
ments" of Corporate Officers, 9 ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 35, 42 (1978), it is difficult to
[Vol. 30:3
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The second category of nonreportable remuneration under the
First Release consists of personal benefits which are "ordinary
and necessary to the conduct of company business. '28 For bene-
fits to fall within this exclusion, three requirements must be met.
Ordinary and necessary benefits are those which:
(1) Are available to management employees generally;
(2) Do not relieve the individual of expenditures normally
considered to be of a personal nature; and
(3) Are extended to management solely for the purpose of:
(a) Attracting and maintaining qualified personnel;
(b) Facilitating their conduct of company business;
or
(c) Improving their efficiency in job performance.29
The example provided by the SEC under this exception is an
itemized expense account.3 0
The absence of logic in the SEC's articulation of the ordinary
and necessary exception is readily apparent. The requirement
that the benefit be available to management employees generally
is not related to the question whether the benefit is provided for
business purposes. A salesperson may utilize certain club mem-
berships completely for business purposes, thereby receiving no
remuneration, whereas such a benefit may not be necessary to the
business purposes of a particular company's controller;3 I but if
such a membership were provided generally to management em-
ployees, under the SEC's rationale the value of the controller's
understand how this issue is related to the requirement that remuneration be disclosed.
The same is true with respect to the question whether the benefit is properly authorized
under state law. Perhaps these two qualifications merely reflect the disquieting trend, man-
ifest in the SEC's activities in the questionable payments context, toward using the federal
disclosure system to achieve substantive ends. See generally Freeman, The Legality of the
SEC's Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAW. 1295 (1976); Note, Foreign Bribes and
the Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1222 (1976).
28. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6.
29. Id (emphasis added).
30. Id However, the SEC suggested that expense accounts may be forms of remuner-
ation "if they are excessive in amount of [sic] conferred to [sic] frequently." Id This limi-
tation is illogical since it does not relate to the essential inquiry-whether the expenditure
constitutes a personal benefit in the first instance.
The SEC has taken the firm position that "an unitemized expense account would be a
form of remuneration. . . except to the extent [that] specific amounts spent by an executive
using such an expense account can be identified as relating to valid business related ex-
penses." Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-15 to -16. See also First Release, supra
note 4, at 17,059-6. Thus, the burden is on both the company and the executive to justify
the business use of an unitemized expense account. In some instances that burden may not
be easily met. E.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1979, at 12, col. 2.
31. McCoy & Griffin, supra note 23, at 38, col. 4.
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membership would be nonreportable along with the value of the
salesperson's membership.
The second requirement-that qualifying benefits not relieve
the recipient of expenditures normally thought to be personal in
nature-is similarly perplexing. If a benefit meets this require-
ment and is thus excepted because it is deemed not to be of a
personal nature, it is illogical to have included it as a "personal
benefit" in the first instance. Conversely, if a benefit is deemed
"personal" within the general rule requiring disclosure, it is diffi-
cult to see how it can meet the requirement of the ordinary and
necessary exception that it not be personal in nature.32
Finally, the three purposes set forth in the third requirement
for the ordinary and necessary limitation are not particularly illu-
minating. The first purpose-that of attracting and maintaining
qualified personnel-is broad enough to encompass virtually any
personal benefit. Benefits that satisfy the other two pur-
poses-that of facilitating the performance of company business
and that of improving efficiency in job performance-are not
"personal" in the first instance.
The ultimate justification for issuing the interpretive releases is
the Commission's view that they would "help registrants assure
that the aggregate remuneration reported in registration state-
ments, reports, and proxy and information statements contains all
forms of remuneration, including salary, fees, bonuses and other
personal benefits received by management. 33 However, the nu-
merous inadequacies of the two releases practically ensure that is-
suers and registrants will react differently from each other and
inconsistently with the underlying concerns that gave rise to the
issuance of the releases in the first place, except possibly with re-
spect to the few specific items addressed in the Second Release. In
sum, the SEC has failed to provide general principles against
which those benefits not specifically covered by the Second Re-
lease can be measured, and the Commission's effort to identify
general principles which can be utilized to exclude certain per-
sonal benefits has produced ambiguous and logically inconsistent
results. It therefore seems appropriate that an effort be under-
taken to identify the general principles which should control in
this context.
32. See Eppler & Yaeger, supra note 23, at 844.




1. Distinguishing Perquisites from Remuneration
At present, the relevant statutory provisions require only that
"remuneration" paid by the issuer or registrant be disclosed.34 In
1976, the SEC proposed various amendments to the disclosure re-
quirements applicable to management background and specifi-
cally invited comment on the suggestion that registrants be
required to disclose "the numerous emerging forms of indirect
compensation or 'perquisites' now given to management person-
nel."' 35 It should be noted, however, that the focus of the existing
disclosure rules is not on the availability of perquisites in a gen-
eral sense; that a particular executive may be provided with more
than is absolutely necessary to perform his or her assigned tasks
(for example, first-class travel, expensive office furnishings, or the
availability of executive dining facilities) is irrelevant to the dis-
closure system.36 Rather, inquiry must focus only upon the "re-
muneration" paid to officers and directors.37 The problem, then,
is one of isolating principles which should control the latter deter-
mination.
2. Governing Princiles
a. Expenditure by the Corporation. It should be axiomatic
that to constitute remuneration paid by the issuer or registrant
within the meaning of the federal securities laws "something of
positive value must pass from the corporation to the insider. '38 If
the company incurs no expense, no remuneration is paid by it. It
was most likely this perception which led the SEC to the appar-
ently absolute conclusion that personal benefits such as home re-
pairs or personal travel expenses must be disclosed as
remuneration,39 whereas third-party benefits such as favorable
bank loans constitute remuneration only when "the corporation
compensates, directly or indirectly, the bank ...for providing
the loan."40
34. E.g., Item 14 of Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(14) (1976).
35. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5758 (Nov. 16, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 834,
835 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-16.
37. See note 34 supra.
38. Lewis v. Dansker, 357 F. Supp. 636, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
39. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
40. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6. See text accompanying note 21 supra. But
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b. Corporate Expenditure as Substitute for Personal Expense
94hich Would Otherwise be Incurred by the Reciient. Under the
terms of the First Release, the question whether an otherwise per-
sonal benefit "relieves the individual of expenditures normally
considered to be of a personal nature" is but one of the tests for
determining whether it is an ordinary and necessary expenditure
and, therefore, excludable from reported remuneration.4' This
test, however, should be a sine qua non for the conclusion that a
particular nonmonetary benefit constitutes remuneration" be-
cause it focuses precisely upon the relevant question whether the
purpose and application of a particular benefit relates to business
(nonremunerative) or personal (remunerative) matters. In addi-
tion, it has the virtue of injecting some predictability into the anal-
ysis in this area. It is significant that each of the six types of
nonmonetary benefits identified in the First Release as presump-
tively constituting remuneration meets this test in most circum-
stances.43
Moreover, it may be that some benefits should not be thought
of as relieving the recipient of what would otherwise constitute a
personal expense in the absence of some reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the recipient would have personally incurred the ex-
pense regardless of his or her position in the corporation or the
availability of the corporate benefit. For example, an executive
would obviously not be expected to pay for his or her own fur-
nishings at company facilities. It could further be argued that no
reportable remuneration accrues if, for example, the spouse of an
executive hitches a ride on a corporate airplane for personal travel
purposes when the plane was already destined to fly to a particu-
lar location for business purposes. In this circumstance it seems
unlikely that the spouse would have incurred the personal expense
had the airplane not been available. Although it could be argued
that these items fall within the exception for "incidental" personal
benefits,44 it seems clear that the SEC would not concur.45
see text accompanying notes 70-77 infra (discussing the SEC's position with respect to
"hitchhikers" on corporate aircraft).
41. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6. See text accompanying notes 28-29 and
32 supra.
42. E.g., Eppler & Yaeger, supra note 23, at 844 ("[A] benefit that does not relieve an
individual of personal expenditures should not be remuneration."). See also McCoy &
Griffin, supra note 23, at 39, col. 3.
43. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-5. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
44. Id
45. See, e.g., Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-11.
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This is not to say that all personal benefits which (1) involve
expenditures by the corporation and (2) relieve the recipients of
expenses personal in nature which they would otherwise person-
ally incur necessarily constitute reportable remuneration. It is
here that the exceptions articulated in the First Release come into
play for expenses which are ordinary and necessary to the conduct
of the company's business or merely provide incidental personal
benefits.
c. Exceptions. (i) Ordinary and Necessary Business Expend-
itures. The SEC stated in the First Release that certain ordinary
and necessary personal benefits need not be reported as remunera-
tion provided they (1) are available to management personnel
generally, (2) do not relieve the recipient of expenditures normally
considered to be of a personal nature, and (3) are extended solely
for the purposes of attracting and maintaining qualified personnel,
facilitating the conduct of company business, or improving job
performance.46
As discussed above, the second requirement that the benefit
not relieve the recipient of expenditures personal in nature should
not be allowed to stand since it virtually eliminates the excep-
tion. 47 Given the illogic of this second prong of the ordinary and
necessary test, and the ease with which most personal benefits will
qualify under one of the three purposes in the test's third prong
(especially that of attracting and maintaining qualified personnel),
the principal inquiry in this context should be whether the per-
sonal benefit is available to management personnel generally. It
was probably this rationale which led the SEC, in the amended
disclosure rules, to exempt flatly any personal benefit which is
"provided to broad categories of employees" and does not "dis-
criminate in favor of officers or directors. '48 This change in the
amended disclosure requirements would bring the rule in line
with the SEC's stated rationale for requiring disclosure of per-
sonal benefits--enabling investors to determine the value of the
issuer or registrant's shares, to assess the value of management,
and to uncover any management exercise of undue influence in
46. See First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6. See text accompanying note 29
supra. This concept, as such, did not appear in the Second Release except for the specific
discussion of group life and health plans. See Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-13.
47. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
48. Instruction 2(d) to Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,764.
1979]
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securing special benefits.49
(ii) Incidental Personal Bene6fts. The SEC's exception for
"incidental" personal benefits is narrowly phrased in the First Re-
lease. Incidental benefits are those which, like furnishings at com-
pany-maintained offices, are "directly related to job
performance."50 However, the SEC's interpretation of this lan-
guage has been somewhat broader in scope; company expendi-
tures less intimately related to job performance, such as parking
places and meals at company facilities, have also been excluded
thereunder."
The exclusion of incidental benefits should have both qualita-
tive and quantitative components. The qualitative component
centers analysis on the essential purpose of the benefit. For exam-
ple, that an executive may be flown on corporate aircraft to a busi-
ness meeting when a commercial flight was available should not
mean that he or she received reportable remuneration. Similarly,
if executives are permitted or encouraged to play golf at company
expense in the course of week-long staff meetings, no reportable
remuneration should thereby accrue.52
The quantitative aspect focuses on the relative value of the
benefit to the recipient. While traditional standards of materiality
are not determinative, 53 some commentators have urged that at
49. The SEC stated in the First Release that, due to management's great influence in
determining its own remuneration, disclosure of executive remuneration was required to
enable a shareholder or investor to determine the value of the registrant's shares and to
assess the value of management. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-5. It can be as-
sumed that such interests are adequately served by the general statutory requirement that
material information be disclosed, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k, 78k(b), 79o(a), 79o(e) (1976), and
that the proposed modification of the ordinary and necessary test would have no detrimen-
tal impact on this purpose.
In the Second Release, the SEC added the notation that disclosure of remuneration
information "is significant in maintaining public confidence in the corporate system." Sec-
ond Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-8. The concerns of the Second Release seem to relate
to situations approaching misappropriation of corporate assets or involving falsification of
corporate books and records. Where particular benefits are provided on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis, it seems unlikely that management would have exercised undue influence in
securing such benefits; benefits available to management personnel generally are likely to
be usual in nature and reasonable in amount.
50. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6. See text accompanying notes 24-27
supra. This language is repeated in the amended disclosure rules. Instruction 2(d) to Item
4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,764.
51. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6.
52. See, e.g., Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-11 to -12 (incidental use of a
company-maintained apartment does not constitute remuneration).
53. Traditional disclosure analysis focuses on the effect or potential effect of an expen-
diture or event on an issuers consolidated revenues, income, or assets. Eg., Item 5 of
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least a de minimis rule should exist in this context. 4 The SEC
adopted an analogous concept in the amended disclosure rules,
although it is clear that the SEC staff refuses expressly to recog-
nize a de minimis principle, as such, in this context. If the issuer
cannot ascertain the specific amount of benefits or the extent to
which the benefits are personal rather than business-related "with-
out unreasonable effort or expense," the amount may be excluded
if it does not exceed $10,000 with respect to any individual as to
whom disclosure is required.55
d. Summary. Although the SEC has thus far failed so to do,
it is possible to identify principles which can generally be used to
guide analysis of whether a particular corporate benefit constitutes
reportable remuneration under the federal securities laws. As a
threshold matter, a benefit should not be deemed to constitute re-
muneration unless it involves (1) an expenditure by a registrant or
issuer which (2) relieves the recipient of an expense personal in
nature that he or she would otherwise be likely to incur. Even if
these conditions are met, it may be that a particular benefit, which
would then be deemed a "personal benefit," will not constitute
reportable remuneration if it is a benefit which meets the test of
being either ordinary and necessary (i e., available to management
personnel generally) or merely incidental to an essentially job-re-
lated function. It seems appropriate to test a number of benefits
commonly provided to executives by United States corporations
against these general principles. 56
Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,781 (disclosure of pending litigation). In general, re-
muneration information must be disclosed without respect to whether it would be regarded
as material under this type of analysis. E.g., Eppler & Yaeger, supra note 23, at 842.
54. Eg., Garrett, supra note 27, at 42. Analysis of this quantitative aspect has led
some to the conclusion, in other contexts, that even if certain facts might be deemed mate-
rial, it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion that they must be disclosed; the costs in-
volved must be balanced against the benefits to be obtained. See, e.g., Ash v. Baker, 392 F.
Supp. 368, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum that expense of resolicitation of proxies outweighed
potential benefits), aff'd, 530 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976); SEC
Securities Act Release No. 34-11733 (Oct. 14, 1975), reprinted in [1975-76 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 80,310.
55. Instruction 2(d)(ii) of Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,764. In the
Third Release, the Division of Corporation Finance stated flatly that the conditional exclu-
sion in Instruction 2(d)(ii) "is not a de minimis perquisite exclusion . . . .The specific
amounts of any personal benefits, no matter how small, are to be included if they can be
determined with reasonable effort or expense." Third Release, supra note 12, at 61,779.
56. In addition, a number of valuation problems will be addressed herein as they be-
come relevant. In its interpretive releases, the SEC indicated an intent to allow issuers and
registrants great flexibility in valuing reportable personal benefits. Eg., First Release,
supra note 4, at 17,059-6 to -7 ("Non-monetary forms of valuation must be valued as
1979]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW V
II. ANALYSIS OF PARTICULAR BENEFITS
A. Corporate Facilities and Other Properties
1. Automobiles
The practice of providing company-owned or -leased
automobiles to officers is relatively common among large corpora-
tions. 7 While the nature of corporate automobile programs var-
ies greatly, in many instances companies pay the total rental or
purchase price, maintenance expenses, and insurance premiums.
Reimbursement for personal use of the automobiles may be, but
often is not, required.
The personal use of company-owned or -leased automobiles is
specifically identified in the SEC releases as constituting reporta-
ble remuneration. 8 Of course, when a company automobile is
used solely in connection with job-related matters, the user does
not receive remuneration because he or she is not relieved of any
personal expenditure.5 9 It may be rather unusual, however, for a
company-owned or -leased car over which an executive has com-
plete discretion to be used exclusively for business purposes. In
most situations where company automobiles are used for personal
purposes, some remuneration should be said to have accrued and
the SEC and some commentators seem to contemplate a rather
precise allocation between business and personal use in this con-
accurately as possible. The appropriate valuation may depend upon appraisals, the value
of the benefit to the recipient, the value assigned for tax purposes, or some other appropri-
ate standard."). However, this flexibility was eschewed in the promulgation of the
amended disclosure rules under which personal benefits are to be valued at actual incre-
mental cost to the issuer. Instruction 2(d)(i) of Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5,
at 61,764. But "if such aggregate costs are significantly less than the a~gregate amounts the
recipient would have had to pay to obtain the benefits, appropriate disclosure, including
the aggregate value to the recipient, should be made in a footnote to the table." Id It is
curious that no parallel provision exists for instances in which the recipient's alternative
cost significantly exceeds the registrant's aggregate incremental cost.
57. A 1977 study of executive compensation revealed that approximately 65% of in-
dustrial companies with sales between $500 million and $999 million provide company-
owned or -leased automobiles to their chief executive officers. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc.,
Profile of a Chief Executive Officer 5 (1977). See generally N.Y. Times, May 19, 1977, at
D-l, col. 1.
58. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-5 to -6; Second Release, supra note 10, at
17,059-11.
59. Others have come to this conclusion on the ground that "the time saving element
and the extra productivity by the executive which such time saving generates provide a
basis for not treating the benefit as compensation." McCoy & Griffin, supra note 23, at 38,
col. 5. While this analysis reaches the proper conclusion, it fails to recognize the distinction
between "perquisites" and "remuneration." See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
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text.6" Yet it is possible to envisage circumstances in which some
personal use of a company automobile might not constitute re-
portable remuneration. For example, the occasional personal use
of automobiles in a pool maintained at a particular location might
not constitute remuneration where the automobiles are provided
and used predominantly for business purposes. The personal use
in such circumstances might be considered incidental or in some
situations may come within the exclusion of de minimis benefits as
to which the valuation of personal use cannot be calculated with-
out unreasonable effort.
Where it cannot be said that the extent of personal use is
merely incidental or de minimis, some companies adopt, for the
sake of convenience, standard valuation practices based upon per-
centage or mileage formulas, without otherwise investigating the
actual use patterns of particular executives. Such approaches may
not be sanctioned by the Second Release" and may also raise in-
come tax issues if there are variances between the amounts re-
ported to the IRS and those reported to the SEC. These
considerations have caused a number of companies to adopt reim-
bursement practices based upon the particular executive's per-
sonal use (on a percentage or mileage basis) of company-owned or
-leased automobiles. A few companies have adopted formulas
under which the executive receives reimbursement for business
use at the current IRS allowance rate of seventeen cents per
mile.62 This approach is thought to be particularly appropriate
when the predominant use is personal, as otherwise practically the
entire cost incurred by the company63 would be included as remu-
neration. While it is arguable that the executive receives addi-
tional remuneration to the extent that his or her actual costs are
less than such allowances,' the terms of the Second Release sug-
60. See, e.g., Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-I1; Eppler & Yaeger, supra
note 23, at 845.
61. The SEC stated that the Division of Corporate Finance
would express no objection if the value of this benefit were a percentage of the
cost to the company of leasing or owning the car based upon the amount of time
an executive used the car for personal purposes or the number of miles the car
was used for personal purposes.
Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-11.
62. IRS News Release IR-1892 (Oct. 7, 1977) [1977] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
69,300.
63. In such circumstances the registrant's cost probably constitutes the most reliable,
and easy to administer, standard for valuation. The fact that the company may receive a
discount on cars purchased or leased should be of no consequence. See note 67 infra.
64. See Eppler & Yaeger, supra note 23, at 845, citing Gates Learjet Corp., SEC Staff
Reply (Nov. 28, 1973).
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gest that formulas premised upon appropriate IRS standards will
be recognized for disclosure purposes," and the SEC staff in the
past has informally advised companies that such approaches are
acceptable.
The desirability of utilizing any particular valuation or reim-
bursement approach necessarily depends upon the facts at issue.
In general, a reimbursement policy based upon personal use
would be preferable to a policy based on business use in situations




a. General. When an executive has discretionary use of an
airplane, analysis of the extent to which he or she should be
deemed to have received reportable remuneration will generally
parallel that set forth with respect to automobiles-the use of the
airplane to relieve the executive of expenses which he or she
would otherwise incur for personal purposes should result in re-
portable remuneration.
However, there are a few issues which are peculiar to this con-
text. For example, an officer may use a corporate airplane to at-
tend a meeting of the board of directors of an unaffiliated
company. The executive will probably not have been relieved of a
personal expense which he or she would otherwise have borne
since his or her travel expenses would most likely have been paid
by the other company. Furthermore, an officer's membership on
other boards of directors frequently serves his or her employer's
overall business interests; hence, expenses incurred in that capac-
ity might not be personal in the first instance.
The most difficult issue concerning corporate aircraft is valua-
tion. Although the SEC's opinion on this issue is unclear in the
Second Release, apparently the SEC believes that either the cost
to the executive of alternative means of travel or the allocated ac-
tual cost to the issuer or registrant is appropriate.67 However, if
corporate aircraft is generally used for business purposes, it seems
unreasonable to value the benefit received for a specific personal
use by allocating the actual cost to the issuer or registrant or by
65. Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-11.
66. A reasonable reimbursement policy would obviate the need for disclosure since,
on a net basis, the company would not have expended any funds for the executive's per-
sonal benefit by its provision of the automobile.
67. The SEC stated that:
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using the prevailing market rate of a charter flight. Thus, the use
of the incremental cost to the company is appropriate under the
amended disclosure rules so long as such cost is not "significantly
less" than the aggregate amount which the recipient would other-
wise pay." While such approaches (the utilization of incremental
cost in particular) parallel the principle that an executive receives
remuneration only to the extent that the issuer or registrant incurs
an expense, it is unlikely in most situations that the executive
would have taken a charter airplane had a corporate aircraft not
been available. The use of the probable alternative cost to the
executive-fare on a comparable commercial flight-is preferable
on the ground that the company's cost is disproportionate to the
amount which the executive would have otherwise paid.69
b. Spouses and Hitchhikers. The SEC flatly concluded in the
Second Release that if "the company plane is flown somewhere
for a business reason and an executive who does not have com-
pany business to transact at such place hitches a ride or tags along
on the plane, [such] executive receive[s] a form of remunera-
tion."70 Given the provision in the amended disclosure rules that
benefits furnished to other persons which indirectly benefit man-
agement must be included as reportable remuneration, 7' the
SEC's position with regard to executive hitchhikers would seem to
apply equally to spouses and other hitchhikers who are depen-
dents of the executive. While it is arguable under the terms of the
Second Release that the value to be ascribed to this benefit is
merely the modest additional expenses incurred by the company
The Division [of Corporation Finance] would express no objection if the personal
use of company assets were valued using one of the following methods:
a) determining the recipient's cost if he had obtained the use of equivalent
assets independently of the corporation; or
b) allocating a portion of the cost to the corporation of owning and main-
taining the facility during a particular year on the basis of the time the asset was
used for personal purposes or the mileage of such usage unless this amount is
disproportionate to the amount which the recipient would have paid if he had
obtained the use of equivalent assets himself.
Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-12 (emphasis added). The term "equivalent as-
sets" suggests that the cost of a charter, rather than a commercial, flight is intended.
68. Instruction 2(d)(i) of Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,764.
69. Some companies have formally adopted security programs which require top ex-
ecutives to use corporate aircraft on personal trips; the executives then reimburse the com-
pany in an amount equivalent to a comparable commercial fare. Where reasonable
grounds exist for such a program, the requirement for additional reimbursement to the
extent of the cost of a charter trip is arguably unnecessary.
70. Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-I1.
71. Instruction 2(d) to Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,764.
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as a result of the hitchhiker's presence on the airplane,72 the SEC
staff asserted in an open session held to review the Second Release
that the value to be reported should be the cost of a comparable
commercial flight.73
It seemingly would be more reasonable to conclude that very
little, if any, remuneration should be said to accrue to an executive
when he or she, a spouse, or a dependent hitches a ride on a com-
pany airplane otherwise flying to a particular location for business
purposes, so long as no one is displaced.74 In this circumstance,
the registrant incurs only a modest additional expense at most,
even though the executive may have received a substantial per-
sonal benefit under the terms of the amended disclosure rules and
the releases.75 Moreover, a personal travel expense would proba-
bly not otherwise have been incurred if a corporate airplane had
not been available.
It is difficult to reconcile the SEC's position on hitchhiking
with the approach it takes toward third-party benefits such as
loans or supplier discounts, which constitute reportable remunera-
tion only if the company directly or indirectly reimburses the third
party for supplying them.76 While it is true that, unlike hitchhik-
ing on corporate aircraft, the benefit is not provided by the com-
pany in the third-party situations, this fact should be of no import.
The relevant inquiry in the hitchhiking area should be whether
the company has incurred any additional expense due to the bene-
fit it has provided.
Somewhat different considerations may exist as a practical
matter when spouses or hitchhikers accompany executives on per-
72. The SEC stated, "Although the corporation may have incurredlittle cost as a result
of providing air transportation to the extra person(s), the value of this personal benet
should be included in aggregate remuneration or otherwise reported." Second Release,
supra note 10, at 17,059-11 (emphasis added). If the phrase "this personal benefit" were
read as referring to the corporation's additional "little cost," only the corporation's actual
incremental cost would be includable as remuneration.
73. 26 BNA Daily Rep. for Exec. G-2 (Feb. 7, 1978). See McCoy & Griffin, supra
note 23, at 38, col. 5. In the Third Release, the Division of Corporation Finance staff
indicated that the amended disclosure rules had "revised" the Second Release on this
point. Third Release, supra note 12, at 61,779.
74. In some cases there may be a direct business purpose for a spouse accompanying
an executive on a business trip. Moreover, many companies have formal or informal poli-
cies encouraging spouses to accompany executives on relatively extended trips. Such a
policy is frequently rationalized on the ground that the company has a legitimate business
interest in easing the personal stress on the executive which may be caused by extended
travel.
75. See text accompanying notes 16-33 supra.
76. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,056-6. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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sonal trips. If the issuer or registrant treats the actual, incremen-
tal, or charter cost of the executive's trip as his or her reportable
remuneration, there is no basis for the inclusion of any additional
amount for the spouse's or hitchhiker's trip, as the cost to the com-
pany is not increased by the presence of the additional per-
son-the plane was flying to that destination anyway. However, if
a comparable first-class fare were to be utilized it would appear, at
least with respect to spouses and family members who are depen-
dents of the executive, that a similar per capita charge ought to be
made for the additional persons. It seems reasonable to assume
that no additional remuneration should be attributed to the execu-
tive for hitchhikers who are not dependents, on the ground that
the benefit accruing to the executive is practically impossible to
value and would rarely relieve the executive of what otherwise
would be a personal expense. The Second Release, however, ap-
pears to be at variance with this reasoning."
3. Apartments, Yachts, Lodges, and Other Corporate Properties
The ownership or lease of corporate yachts, apartments, lodg-
es, and other facilities does not necessarily give rise to reportable
remuneration. As was the case with corporate automobiles and
aircraft, the issue turns on the purpose for the ownership or lease
of such facilities and their ultimate use.7"
For example, when a corporation permits its executives to use
a hunting lodge as a vacation place, those executives receive re-
muneration when they use it for that purpose, even if the lodge is
used at other times for business purposes. In this situation, each
executive would be relieved of an otherwise personal expense, at
least to the extent that the corporation thereby incurred additional
expenses.
Under the terms of the Second Release, allocation would seem
to be required where some of the use is for business and some for
77. Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-10 ("Registrants should [include as re-
muneration] those benefits conferred directly to officers, directors and those that may bene-
fit such persons indirectly because they are provided to relatives and friends who do not
perform services for the corporation.").
78. See McCoy & Griffin, supra note 23, at 39, col. 1. This is so even if the facility is
only available to an extremely limited group of executives. For example, if a corporation
maintains an apartment at a branch location for the exclusive business use of an executive
who normally works out of the company's headquarters in another city, it would seem that
no reportable remuneration should be said to accrue under the federal securities laws for
use of the apartment.
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personal purposes.79 However, the exception for incidental per-
sonal benefits will occasionally find application. For example, if
an officer or director decides to stay an extra night at a company
apartment after the conclusion of out-of-town business meetings
to visit friends or attend the theater, it is arguable that such a ben-
efit is merely incidental to the essential business purpose for the
apartment's use.80 While the incremental costs to the registrant,
such as additional maid service, might be deemed to constitute
remuneration, it may be that such benefits could be disregarded as
de minimis. Similarly, when the facility is used for a business pur-
pose, and an executive brings his or her spouse along, no remuner-
ation should accrue to the executive so long as no additional
expense is incurred by the company.
4. Improvements at Personal Residences
Company provision of home repairs or improvements at exec-
utives' personal residences is presumed by the SEC to be a per-
sonal benefit which constitutes reportable remuneration.8
Several of the enforcement actions brought by the SEC in this
area have involved such matters.82 In general, when the company
either directly or indirectly incurs an expense in providing such
repairs or improvements, the recipient is relieved of expenses nor-
mally considered to be personal in nature, and the cost should
constitute reportable remuneration. The actual cost of the repair
or improvement, unless significantly less than the expense that the
recipient would otherwise have borne, should be utilized as the
reported value of the benefit.
There may be circumstances, however, in which repairs or im-
provements made to an executive's home may not constitute re-
muneration. For example, security systems may constitute only
incidental personal benefits if a reasonable corporate need for the
particular type of system can be established.83
79. Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-11.
80. In the section of the Second Release devoted to "living expenses," the SEC ap-
proaches this conclusion. "[The occasional use of a company maintained apartment,
house or other dwelling [is not] a form of remuneration ... provided the dwelling is used
by an officer or director for the purpose of facilitating his conduct of company businesses."
Id at 17,059-13.
81. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-5 to -6. See text accompanying note 20
srupra.
82. E.g., SEC v. Ormand Indus., Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,046 (D.D.C. 1977) (consent judgment); SEC v. Emersons, Ltd., [1976-76
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,544 (D.D.C. 1976) (consent judgment).
83. See Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-13 ("The taking of various security
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B. Services and Related Ben§fts
1. Legal, Tax, and Accounting Services
Services provided to officers or directors by outside legal, tax,
or accounting advisors constitute reportable remuneration if they
are paid for by the company and relate to purely personal matters
of the executive.84 If the bill for outside services is not directly or
indirectly paid by the company, no reportable remuneration ac-
crues.
85
In many circumstances, however, it may be difficult to distin-
guish personal from company-related matters, for example, advice
in connection with transactions in securities or compensation, or
legal representation in the context of governmental investigations.
An appropriate standard in these grey areas, at least with respect
to legal services, may be whether the company could indemnify
the officer or director for such expenses under applicable state cor-
porate law. Nevertheless, the SEC staff has taken the informal
position that indemnification payments do not constitute remuner-
ation "if they are related to expenses that are ordinary and neces-
sary to the conduct of company business."86 In applying this test
to direct payments, including those for tax and accounting serv-
ices, the SEC staff has taken the position that the payments will be
nonreportable only if they constitute ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses for federal income tax purposes.87
With respect to executive use of corporate staff, the SEC has
measures for the protection of executives may not result in any remuneration to such exec-
utive if the individual's life has been threatened because of his position in the company or
if the company reasonably believes that the individual's safety is in jeopardy."). See also
McCoy & Griffin, supra note 23, at 39, col. 2. The difficult issue in this particular context is
the factual question of reasonably determining when the executive's safety is jeopardized.
84. See Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-14.
85. The Second Release stated:
Question: When does a company compensate a client or an outside profes-
sional for providing personal services to an officer or director?
Interpretive response: A company may compensate its client or an outside pro-
fessional directly or indirectly for providing its executive with a service in various
ways including:
a) paying or agreeing to pay a higher than market rate for its purchases or
services obtained from the client or professional as a result of the executive's rela-
tionship with the client; and
b) increasing or undertaking to increase its business dealings with the client
as a result of the executive's relationship with the client.
Id at 17,059-15.
86. Letter from R. Rowe, SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. (Aug. 25, 1977) (on file with the
author). See also Letter from J. Cook, SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. (Sept. 28, 1977) (on file with
the author). This approach was reflected in Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-13.
87. McCoy & Griffin, supra note 23, at 39, col. I. See generally I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976).
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taken the position that the nature of the service provided controls:
"If the services are rendered with respect to a purely personal mat-
ter, such as the preparation of a will or United States tax return,
such usage of the corporate staff would result in a form of remu-
neration to the officer or director."88 It is arguable, however, that
the occasional use of corporate staff for personal services should
not result in remuneration. This would be so to the extent that the
staff personnel are not thereby diverted from performing their
normal job responsibilities, or are not assigned regular duties
which relieve the executive beneficiaries of otherwise personal ex-
penses. In this situation, the company would not have incurred
any incremental expense. If some remuneration must be reported,
the cost to the company would be the most appropriate standard
for valuation, although the amount which the executive would
have paid had he or she hired an unrelated person might also be
used.
2. Moving Expenses and Physicals
In most situations, reimbursement for moving expenses 8 and
periodic physicals9° will not constitute reportable remuneration.
While such benefits involve expenditures by the company which
relieve the recipient of what otherwise may be personal expenses,
they are usually excludable on two independent grounds. First, if
the executive is viewed as an asset to the corporation, his or her
availability and health could be said to be directly related to his or
her value to the company.9' Therefore, such benefits arguably
constitute incidental benefits within the meaning of the First Re-
lease.92 Second, if such benefits are generally available to man-
agement personnel, they would be ordinary and necessary to the
conduct of company business under the alternative exclusion of
the First Release, since they are provided "for the purpose of at-
88. Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-14.
89. Moving expenses normally are reimbursable only where the move was made at the
company's request. If the move merely reflected the executive's desire to change houses or
to relocate in another side of town (unless, perhaps, the company headquarters had been
relocated), reimbursement by the company would constitute reportable remuneration since
it could not be justified on either of the grounds set forth in the text accompanying notes
91-93 infra.
90. See Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-12 ("Payments for physical exami-
nations for executives generally do not result in a form of remuneration to the execu-
tives.").
91. McCoy & Griffin, supra note 23, at 39, col. 1.
92. See text accompanying notes 24-27, 50-55 supra.
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tracting and maintaining qualified personnel."93
Even if a physical examination is provided at a resort, it
should not constitute remuneration so long as it is conducted over
a reasonable period of time and the amount involved is not exces-
sive, regardless of whether the cost incurred by the company ex-
ceeds that which would have been incurred locally.94 However, if
the physical results in a paid vacation for the executive (and in
some cases his or her spouse) and "if the cost of the physical ex-
amination is disproportionate to the cost of a physical examina-
tion at a clinic in a non-resort area," then a portion of the cost
should be treated as remuneration.
95
C. Club Membershios
It is curious that club memberships, which are common non-
monetary corporate benefits, are not specifically mentioned in the
First Release.96 Notwithstanding the SEC's apparent willingness
in the Second Release to treat all club memberships alike, some
distinctions should be drawn among them.
The initiation fee and monthly or annual dues for business
clubs should not constitute reportable remuneration if legitimate
business reasons exist for the membership in and ultimate use of
the club.9 7 Personal use of such memberships should be deemed
"incidental" to this principal business usage,98 thereby placing it
within the exception created by the SEC in the First Release.
However, additional expenses incurred for personal use of busi-
ness clubs would constitute reportable remuneration if such ex-
penses are paid by the company.99
Country clubs present a different set of problems.' The SEC
has taken the position that "if the clubs are used solely for busi-
93. See text accompanying notes 28-32, 46-49 supra.
94. McCoy & Griffin, supra note 23, at 39, col. 1.
95. Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-12.
96. See generally First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-3.
97. The SEC has recognized that the "payment of fees of professional organizations is
not a form of remuneration to the officers or directors if membership in the organization is
necessary to such person's performance of his duties for the company." Second Release,
supra note 10, at 17,059-12. If one assumes that the word "necessary" is not intended to
mean "indispensible," an analogy can readily be drawn between professional organizations
and business clubs such that both would be exempted in the Circumstances described
above.
98. See text accompanying notes 24-27, 50-55 supra.
99. Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-12.
100. If a particular executive is also a member of a family country club at his or her
own expense, the business purpose for other club memberships seems easier to justify.
19791
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ness related matters, the usage does not result in remuneration to
the executive. If, however, the club is used for personal activities,
this usage results in a form of remuneration."10' The SEC also
takes the position that all expenses attributable to personal use of
any club membership by an officer or director must be reported as
remuneration. 1 2 Here, the SEC would probably require disclo-
sure of an allocated portion of the initiation fees and annual dues
as well as disclosure of any personal expenses.
Initiation fees, however, are usually one-time expenditures
which in many situations cannot reasonably be apportioned be-
tween the probable ultimate business and personal uses. Where
an executive's membership in a particular club would be in the
company's business interest, it could be argued that any personal
benefit which accrues from this membership does not involve any
additional expense by the company 0 3 and should not be consid-
ered reportable remuneration. When the personal use of the club
membership is not so great as to cast doubt upon whether the
membership is maintained for business purposes, similar reason-
ing should apply to the payment of periodic dues. Without such
expenditures, the business purpose could not be fulfilled. There-
fore, it may be said that no reportable remuneration accrues be-
cause no additional expense is incurred by the company.'0 4 In
any event, reimbursement by the company for expenses incurred
for personal use of club facilities would constitute reportable re-
muneration.
D. Loans and Discounts
Under the terms of the First Release, "the ability of manage-
ment to obtain benefits from third parties, such as favorable bank
loans and benefits from suppliers," may constitute reportable re-
muneration.10 5 However, only the actual receipt of a third-party
benefit, and not the mere ability to obtain it, should be required to
be disclosed. 0 6 Moreover, under the SEC releases a third-party
benefit must be included as remuneration only in situations in
which "the corporation compensates, directly or indirectly, the
101. Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-12.
102. Id
103. Other writers have reached this result by analogy to rules governing the federal
income tax status of dual-benefit expenses. McCoy & Griffin, supra note 23, at 38, col. 6.
104. Others have disagreed with this conclusion. See id ("[I]t would seem that annual
dues should be pro-rated based upon the relative amounts of business and personal use.").
105. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6.
106. Eppler & Yaeger, supra note 23, at 843.
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bank or supplier for providing the loan or services to manage-
ment."" 7 Only in these circumstances does the issuer or registrant
incur an expense in connection with the provision of the benefit.
As a result, favorable loans or discounts provided by banks or
suppliers merely for the purpose of generating or maintaining
goodwill will not constitute reportable remuneration.
On the other hand, should the company indirectly reward the
third party for providing the benefit, for example, by maintaining
compensating balances at a bank or agreeing to absorb the dis-
counts in future purchases from a supplier, the benefit would con-
stitute reportable remuneration."0 8 Valuation may be difficult in
this context. If the company agrees to absorb discounts in future
purchases, the amount of the discount would represent the
amount of the remuneration. 0 9 However, if the company agrees
only to make future purchases of otherwise needed products at the
then-prevailing rates, it could be argued that there is no third-
party benefit since no additional cost is incurred by the company.
With third-party loans, the value could be said to represent either
the net cost to the company, if any, of the indirect payment to the
bank, or the difference between prevailing terms for similar loans
and those obtained by the executive. The difficulty of affixing a
reliable value under the latter standard suggests that the former
will be applied.
E. Insurance and Medical Reimbursement Plans
Health and life insurance plans which name the executive or
his or her designee as the beneficiary and medical reimbursement
107. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-6. The Second Release has similar language.
"Where the corporation compensates the bank either directly or indirectly for extending
the loan to the executive, the officer or director receives remuneration to the extent of the
benefit derived from such compensation." Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-12.
108. Eppler & Yaeger, supra note 23, at 843.
109. A similar result should obtain with discounts provided by the company so long as
the particular item is not acquired at less than its cost. However, in the SEC's view:
[t]he purchase by officers or directors of the corporation's products at a discount
need not be valued for the purpose of reporting remuneration received by an
executive provided:
a) all or substantially all of the corporation's employees may make
purchases at the same discount or at a discount based upon eligibility criteria
which precludes [sic] individual selection; and
b) the price of the product as a result of the discount is not less than the cost
to the corporation of producing it.
Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-15. The additional requirement that "substan-
tially all of the company's employees" receive discounts is illogical. If the company incurs
no expense, no remuneration should be deemed to have been received.
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plans involve expenditures by the company which relieve the re-
cipient of expenses normally thought to be personal in nature.
Therefore, such benefits may be excluded from reported remuner-
ation only if the plans or arrangements fall within the exception
for group plans which do not discriminate in favor of officers and
directors.1 t 0 Executives' liability insurance requires different
treatment. If such insurance is "intended to relieve officers and
directors of liability relating to their job performance," premiums
and benefits paid do not constitute remuneration."'
III. NATURE OF DISCLOSURE
A separate description of each form of remuneration is not re-
quired by the present disclosure provisions so long as disclosure of
the benefit is not otherwise mandated. The amended disclosure
provisions relating to management remuneration clearly contem-
plate that, after an appropriate value is assigned to nonmonetary
forms of remuneration, such amount will be added to the amounts
reported for the named individuals and the group appearing in the
remuneration tables."t 2 Footnote disclosure is required where the
aggregate amount of reported personal benefits exceeds the lesser
of $25,000 or ten percent of an individual executive's aggregate
remuneration." 3 Such disclosure must include the dollar amount
or percentage of remuneration constituting personal benefits and a
brief description of such benefits." 14
Regardless of the amended disclosure rules, textual disclosure
may be necessary if the transactions at issue are material to share-
holders or investors. In the questionable payments context, the
SEC has frequently articulated the view that the extent to which
directors and executive officers were involved in such matters was
required to be disclosed as bearing on the integrity of manage-
ment." 5 This was true whether or not such payments were
financially material." 6 While its propriety is far from clear ana-
110. Instruction 2(d)(iii) of Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,764.
111. Second Release, supra note 10, at 17,059-13.
112. Instruction 2(d)(iii) of Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 61,764.
113. Id
114. Id
115. SEC Report, supra note 9, at 18-19.
116. Id The SEC stated:
Implicit in such disclosure requirements [evidenced by the items enumerated
in Schedule A] is the assumption that corporations conduct their business and sell
their products on the basis of quality and price rather than bribes and kickbacks.
Such practices not only bear upon the quality of the registrant's business and the
attendant risks, but also on the quality of a registrant's earnings .... The disclo-
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lytically, 1t7 this view has been adopted by some courts" t8 and may
indicate that full disclosure of a situation approaching misappro-
priation of corporate assets will be required.
IV. DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
The SEC's decision to amend Regulation S-K to provide spe-
cifically for disclosure of personal benefits indicates that the thrust
sure system is oriented toward the basic interests of investors, but it does not
speak exclusively to financial relationships and data. Disclosure requirements
should also facilitate an evaluation of management's stewardship over corporate
assets.
Id (emphasis in original). The integrity-of-management rationale for requiring disclosure
is not unique to the questionable payments context. See, e.g., Rafal v. Geneen, [1972-73
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,505, at 92,441 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (fact that a
nominee for election to a board of directors was a defendant in an action alleging improper
use of inside information deemed material under rule 14a-9(a)). For example, in Matter of
Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 170-71 (1964) (footnotes omitted), the SEC stated:
Evaluation of the quality of management-to whatever extent it is possible-is an
essential ingredient of informed investment decision. A need so important it can-
not be ignored, and in a variety of ways the disclosure requirements of the Securi-
ties Act furnish factual information to fill this need. Appraisals of competency
begin with information concerning management's past business experience, which
is elicited by requirements that a prospectus state the offices and positions held
with the issuer by each executive officer within the last 5 years. . . . To permit
judgments whether the corporation's affairs are likely to be conducted in the in-
terest of public shareholders, the registration requirements elicit information as to
the interests of insiders which may conflict with their duty of loyalty to the corpo-
ration. Disclosures are also required with respect to the remuneration and other
benefits paid or proposed to be paid to management as well as material transac-
tions between the corporation and its officers, directors, holders of more than 10
percent of its stock and their associates.
The concerns articulated in cases such as Franchard bear directly upon the relationship of
management's integrity and abilities to the financial interests of investors. In contrast, the
SEC staff has more recently stated that the disclosure system "does not speak exclusively of
financial relationships and data." Instead, emphasis has been placed on "the quality of a
Registrant's earnings." SEC Report, supra note 9, at 18.
117. This approach seems patently inconsistent with that taken by the Commission
with respect to civil rights and other matters of significant social and political concern. See
SEC Securities Act Release, No. 34-11733 (October 14, 1975), [1975-76 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,310. More importantly, to the extent that the SEC begins to
depart from the economic model of disclosure which guides its efforts in other contexts,
"we can begin to wonder what sexual, what ethical, what other things may get involved."
Kripke, Opening Remarks on the Corporation in Crisis, 31 Bus. LAW 1277 (1976). Reliance
upon the federal securities laws to control improper corporate conduct is "inferior to the
direct sanctions normally used by society to prevent antisocial behavior and may, in fact,
undermine the traditional purposes" of such laws. Note, supra note 27, at 1223. It has
been persuasively argued that much of the SEC's activity in this area, in particular that
centered around the integrity-of-management rationale, has exceeded the jurisdiction
granted the Commission by applicable legislation. E.g., Freeman, supra note 27, at
1298-1303. Thus, it is unclear, except perhaps in the most egregious cases, whether this
factor, as articulated by the SEC, should be of significance in this context.
118. E.g., Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
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of its efforts in this area is essentially forward looking. However,
the SEC observed that one of the reasons for issuing the First Re-
lease was that "recent cases brought by the Commission have re-
vealed that some registrants have not disclosed personal benefits
as remuneration.""' 9 By issuing what purport to be interpretive
releases rather than by proposing new rules, the Commission has
ostensibly preserved its authority to bring enforcement actions for
alleged inadequacies of prior filings. 2 ' As a result, it has been
suggested that investigations of disclosure in prior years modeled




However, the enforcement actions cited in the First Release
involved (1) instances in which substantial payments were made
to officers and directors that were concealed on the corporate
books and records; (2) situations amounting to misappropriation
of corporate assets raising the "integrity-of-management" issue;
and (3) in some cases, other traditional securities laws violations
such as alleged schemes to inflate reported earnings or the con-
cealment of transactions which were clearly within the scope of
existing securities laws requirements. 22 Since the first two con-
cerns will rarely be present with respect to nonmonetary forms of
remuneration, where the third concern is absent it would appear
that investigations of prior periods should not normally be under-
taken unless the company has knowledge of such matters.
Nevertheless, companies are on notice that the SEC now ex-
pects proxy statements and other filings to contain appropriate
disclosures of nonmonetary forms of remuneration. It is clear that
the SEC also expects issuers and registrants to implement proce-
dures to ensure that such remuneration is identified and disclosed:
The Commission notes with approval, that, as a step toward
improving the data upon which such disclosures are based,
some corporations have established procedures by which in-
dependent auditors review management remuneration and re-
port to the audit committee of the board of directors; in other
119. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-3. See generally SEC v. Montauk Corp.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,114 (D.D.C. 1979).
120. Eppler & Yaeger, supra note 23, at 846.
121. Wiesen, Directors Must Confront Perks Issues, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, § 3, at
14, col. 3 (editorial). See also Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1979, at 12, col. 2.
122. See Eppler & Yaeger, supra note 23, at 846, n.13, discussing SEC v. Ormand In-
dus., Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,046 (D.D.C. 1977);
SEC v. Kneapler, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,018 (S.D. Fla.




corporations, the board of directors may even be responsible
for approving or disapproving the aggregate remuneration of
all or certain members of management. In view of the all-in-
clusive nature of the required disclosure, the Commission urges
all registrants to analyze thoroughly the internal controls and
procedures by which management remuneration is identified
and disclosed in order to assure that all required disclosures are
made. 123
It has been suggested that questions relating to nonmonetary
forms of remuneration be included in the conflict of interest ques-
tionnaires which many companies distribute to officers or direc-
tors in the course of preparing proxy statements or, if no such
questionnaire is regularly distributed, in a special questionnaire
designed specifically for remuneration disclosure purposes. 124
However, several considerations militate against such an, ap-
proach. As a practical matter, it will be difficult for a given officer
or director to identify reportable remuneration given the ambigui-
ties of the SEC's pronouncements and the few other authorities in
this area. Responses to any such questionnaire are likely to be
inconsistent and, perhaps, unnecessarily detrimental to other cor-
porate interests. (For example, legitimate positions accepted by
the IRS may be undercut.) Moreover, unlike the situations in-
volving investigations of questionable payments, the number of
relevant individuals will be relatively limited and the company is
likely to have the necessary information required to meet its dis-
closure obligations in the first instance.
It may be appropriate for particular company personnel (for
example, an internal auditor and/or a staff attorney) to collect the
necessary information in this area on an annual basis, employing
a general analysis of the available benefits, record checks, and per-
sonal interviews to the extent appropriate.'25 In addition, the sug-
gestion in the First Release that the procedures designed to ensure
adequate disclosure be reviewed by an independent committee of
123. First Release, supra note 4, at 17,059-7.
124. McCoy & Griffin, supra note 23, at 39, col. 3.
125. Several companies have already conducted what appear to be entirely adequate
investigations without recourse to questionnaires. It might be argued that relying princi-
pally upon corporate records supplemented by the company's system of internal audit con-
trols is inadequate since it may fail to detect the most egregious cases-instances in which
records have been falsified to conceal particular benefits. Nevertheless, internal auditing
controls do exist, and it seems unlikely that one who is compelled to falsify records (now
proscribed by Title I of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78q,
78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. 1979)) would respond affirmatively to a questionnaire on this
topic in any event.
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a company's board of directors 26 seems advisable.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over whether so-called corporate perquisites must
be disclosed in ordinary statements and reports under the federal
securities laws has been mooted by the amendments to Schedule
S-K which generally require such disclosure. However, the SEC
has yet to articulate overriding principles in this context to guide
issuers in determining whether the value of particular benefits
must be disclosed and to elucidate what reporting companies
should do to fulfill their disclosure obligations. This Article, in
focusing upon the principles which can be gleaned from the SEC's
publications in this context, is intended to fill this void.
126. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
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